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Akron Law Review
ORDER IN THE COURTS REVISITED:
Progress and Prospects of Controlling Delay in the
Tort Jury Litigation Process, 1966-1973
JAMES G. FRANCE*
INTRODUCTION
EARLY IN 1969, under a grant from the Knight Foundation, measurement
of delay in litigation in six northeastern Ohio counties was undertaken
by a study group from University of Akron School of Law. A year later
the group reported its findings as to delay in the civil jury, criminal and
appellate fields in a 200-page report: Order In The Courts.'
The report, moderately publicized, had little impact on bench and
bar for reasons that were then not fully appreciated but are now
apparent. The first and major reason was that the report did not purport
to show where delay, as such, existed, for there was then no useful data
* B.A., Brown University; L.L.B., Yale University; Professor of Law, University of
Akron School of Law; formerly Judge, Court of Appeals of Ohio, Seventh Appellate
District.
I France, ORDEa IN Tm COURsTS, A Report on Time Span for Disposition of Litigation
in Six Northeastern Ohio Counties, The Knight Foundation, Inc., 1970. [hereinafter
cited as ORDER IN THE COURTS].
An introductory chapter to the report indicated long time spans as to individual
cases in some counties, aggregating four years through the appellate stage in unem-
ployment compensation cases, and a few criminal cases from other counties in Ohio
in which the appellate process occupied even more time. Recent cases within the
six-county area have now eclipsed them in lengthy time spans. The tort jury case delay
record, at least in the six-county area, is now being established by Harvilla v. Trainor,
#22476, Medina County, in which an original petition for personal injury was filed
September 16, 1966, with trial in June, 1973, and appeals to follow. Its companion
case, Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Trainor and Harvilla, a declaratory judgment
action, lasted from February 24, 1967, to March 18, 1973. See 33 Ohio St. 2d 41, 294
N.E.2d 874 (1973). Its criminal case counterpart in time span, State of Ohio v.
Marion Jones, #6151 Portage County, concerned a post-conviction remedy proceeding
from a 1963 conviction. The defendant's petition to vacate was filed October 24, 1970.
After one trip to the Court of Appeals, the trial court ordered sentence vacated and
a rearraignmnent on February 22, 1973. The case is once more in the Court of Appeals
(June, 1973) without decision.
An extremely stale Ohio case was Rothfuss v. Hamilton Masonic Temple Co.,
34 Ohio St.2d 176 . ..... N.E.2d ...... (1973), a property owner's nuisance negligence
claim. The accident happened May 5, 1959; petition for recovery was filed in cases
#79245 and #79246 on April 17, 1961. Trial was had March 26, 1969, in Butler
County. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the jury award of modest damages on
May 30, 1973, after one previous trip in which the court remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals on a point of practice. 27 Ohio St. 2d 131, 271 N.E.2d 801 (1971).
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on how long it should take any of the civil cases involved in the study to
be resolved or terminated. The study could show only how long it took
each of the six different common pleas courts, with widely varying
population loads, with differing internal organization, age and experience
of judges and amount of staff support, to dispose of groups of similarly
selected tort jury, criminal and miscellaneous non-domestic relations
cases. The time taken by the most expeditious court in each group
of cases and for each stage in case processing was regarded as the
reasonably attainable goal, and delay was reckoned as the excess time
taken by the other five courts involved in the study.2
This rather crude means of calculation was dictated by complete
lack of data of the time formerly taken in the leading county for
disposition of tort or other jury eligible cases, the experience of counties
elsewhere in Ohio, and by a complete lack of standards set for the
process. The only basis for prediction of disposition times lay in
the Calendar Status Studies published by the Institute of Judicial
Administration which included two of the six counties studied.3 But the
latter studies were concerned only with the time taken from the date
the cases reached pleading issue or trial readiness to the date of trial of
those cases actually tried.4 They neglected that portion of the total
time span which was expended from date of filing to date of issue
in those cases which they measured. Furthermore, the study ignored the
entire time from filing to disposition of all cases disposed of by default
judgment, dismissal, settlement and summary judgment, modes of
disposition which together constitute more than 60 per cent of the case
termination in tort cases in almost all courts.5
In the three years since publication of the original time lapse study,
most of the missing guideposts have been added. In each of the counties
previously studied, other samplings have been taken at two-year or more
frequent intervals so that variations in the time span from year to year
could be determined. The record in each county now consists of samples,
2 ORDER IN THE COURTS, supra note 1, at 13, 14.
3 Only Cuyahoga County (Cleveland) and Summit County (Akron) were considered
eligible for inclusion in the Calendar Status Studies, by reason of minimum population
requirements. See INTRODUCTION TO CALENDAR STATUS STUDIES, Institute of Judicial
Administration, 1969.
4 The time used was the average time for those cases selected by the local Clerk of
Courts or assignment commissioner according to sampling formula suggested by the
Institute of Judicial Administration [hereinafter cited as IJA].
5 The 60 per cent figure is conservative. In New Jersey the trial rate was only 23
per cent. M. ROSEaBERO, THE PRETRIAL AND EFs'acTsvE JUSTICE 22, (1964). In South
Carolina the trial rate varied from 10 to 32 per cent. The Judicial System of South
Carolina, Project Office Draft, IJA, 1971. In Tennessee the rate varied from six to
20 per cent. Appendix to Final Report, The Judicial System of Tennessee, IJA,
14-18, 1971. In most of the other counties studied independently the trial rate did not
exceed 20 per cent.
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selected on the same basis as the original ones, for each of the years
1968, 1970 and 1972, in addition to the year 1966 previously studied. In
addition the so-called leadership or target county, Portage, has been
examined back to the year 1961 as a further check to see if its 1966 case
record was, in fact, a target record or the best that might be expected in
terms of expedition, with results shown in the modified comparison graph,
Table I. The search and plotting of elapsed times has also been extended
to survey seven other counties, primarily metropolitan, included in the
comparison for at least some of the years involved.
6
But more extensive comparisons are available from samples of tort
jury filings taken, on the same basis as the original samples, from
substantial areas of six other states, four in connection with studies of
state court systems or jury utilization studies conducted by the Institute
of Judicial Administration 7 and two others independently by the
author.8 Other published studies by the Institute for Court Management,
particularly that for Wayne County (Detroit) Michigan, 9 have yielded
comparable data. Also, a rough correspondence formula for the use of
the Calendar Status Studies has been devised so that the progress of case
processing can be shown for major centers in nearly all the 50 states.' 0
Since the method used in the Order In The Courts study, which
concentrated on time for disposition primarily of the median case in point
of elapsed time, left something to be desired in showing the rate of
progress of disposition of the whole sample of cases, a new method
of showing that rate has been devised. This new method is to show the
entire disposition of the case samples as a single line on a graph, of which
time in months is the abscissa and completion of each 10 per cent of the
case sample, on a cumulative basis, is the ordinate. Thus, the various
progress lines from county to county, and in the same county from year
6 Original ORDER IN THE COURTS Counties were: Cuyahoga, Summit, Stark, Mahoning,
Trumbull, and Portage. Data gathered for the filing year 1968 from Hamilton,
Franklin, Montgomery, Medina, Clark, and Greene counties was also used for
purposes of comparison with similar counties in other states and for constructing
composite graph line. See France, The Williamsburg Consensus: Some Errors and
Omissions, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 25-28 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 14 WM. &
MARY L. REv.].
7States in which these studies occurred were South Carolina, Tennessee, Louisiana
and New Jersey. Some of the Ohio courts, as well as Pennsylvania ones, were surveyed
in connection with jury utilization studies of U.S. District Courts in or near the
county seats of the counties in question.
8Al studies in Florida, and most of those in Pennsylvania, were conducted
independently.
9 See Analysis of the Civil Calendaring Procedures of the Third Judicial Circuit
Court, Wayne County, Michigan, The Institute for Court Management, 31 Table V,
1971.
10 The graphing, based on such formula, is approximate as based on months required
for disposition of 50 and 67 per cent of cases only. Characteristics of the graph line,
based on the type of calendar control practiced for that community, must be
ascertained. See France supra note 6, at 38.
Fall, 19731
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to year, can be compared either by overlay, by successive recordings on a
chronologically arranged time basis, or even collected as a composite of
groups of counties for comparison with other such groups. Such composite
comparison graphs can be used to aid in analysis of the success or failure
of systems of structure, organization and management in a particular
county or state. For instance, Table I illustrates the Ohio record for the
filing year 1968 against six other states, primarily for the year 1969.
The method used in taking the case samples was not, as others have
suggested," based on a statistically sound random sample and thus does
not result in calculations free from all statistical bias. Since the tort case
study involved, originally northeast Ohio, later other states, some data
from small counties, and the desire for a limited time frame in the
filings, sampling was not possible. Rather, all or nearly all cases in the tort
category had to be used; only obvious "companion" cases of related
plaintiffs against the same defendant and obvious property damage
subrogation claims were excluded to insure that the small number (32 to
38) of cases used did not extend over more than a three-months' filing
period. In the larger communities, where sampling was possible, a
rudimentary randomness was achieved by taking every second or every
third case,12 thus limiting the time spread in filing dates to a two- or
three-week period. In an effort to achieve a closer approach to a true
random sample, a key number consisting of the last three digits of a
docket number was used in all counties surveyed.13 This effort created
an undesirable time spread between the counties studied, with four of
the counties' calculations based on April filings and the other two
on fall filing dates. Since there is a discernible difference in progress of
cases filed at different seasons of the year, 14 some additional inaccuracy
1 Hearings on H.R. 15947 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 17 at 12 (1970). Testimony of the Cleveland Bar
Association quoted findings as to Cuyahoga County, in ORDER IN THE COURTS, as
based on a random sample. See Briggs, The Lawyer's Role in Criminal Justice
Reform, 22 S. CAR. L. REV. 738, 750 (1970).
12 This method was used in Cleveland and Columbus, Ohio, and in New Orleans,
Louisiana. In Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, where ten and four appearance dockets are
used simultaneously for recording successive filings, samples from two dockets in the
former and one in the latter community satisfied the need for randomness of selection.
13 ORDER IN THE COURTS, supra note 1, at 17.
14 Two sets of samples for Portage County were taken for each of the years 1970 and
1972, one in the spring, the other in the fall. In both cases it was found that fall
filings showed earlier dispositions for at least the first 40 per cent of terminations.
Thereafter the progress lines of spring and fall samples tended to coincide. The 1966
filings on which ORDER IN THE COURTS findings were based took fall filings in
Trumbull and Portage counties and spring filings in all other counties.
Statistics quoting any percentage of case dispositions other than those shown in
ORDER IN THE COURTS are based upon field searches of the respective courts, made at
one- and two-year intervals, and progress graphs constructed therefrom. The search
results and graphs remain unpublished and can be found in the field file folders
maintained by the author in the files of the AKRON LAW REvIEw.
Fall, 1973]
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may have developed in the original Knight Foundation report. Therefore,
all case samples taken henceforth were based on filings entered shortly
after April 1st of each year.
The problem of lack of standards, in tort jury cases at least, has been
solved. A standard has been set for Ohio by the Rules of Superintendence
adopted by the Supreme Court,' 5 and binding on each common pleas court
of the state, so that it can be determined how each county is measuring
up to the externally set standard. It may be questioned whether that
standard-24 months for the disposition of personal injury cases L--is
a realistic one or whether it is too broadaxe, ignoring the special
problems of some counties, or whether it is too rigid in setting only
one time standard for the disposition of the totality of the cases, rather
than setting staggered times for disposition of increasing percentages
of the whole case load. But in any event, the Ohio common pleas
courts now do have an externally imposed goal to meet and progress
toward that goal can be shown for each county in the state.
In terms of the foregoing improvements of measurement and display
techniques and the existence of an external standard, it should now be
possible to show several important points. First, whether the original
survey was reasonably accurate in indicating that the seven-month period
taken by Portage County for its median time 17 in disposing of jury
eligible cases was the optimum time for disposition of tort jury
cases. Second, which counties have, since the filing year 1966, improved
their case processing time and whether or not they have maintained
such improvement. Third, the extent to which the structural and
administrative changes, as well as imposition of standards, by the
Rules of Superintendence, have improved the time span for disposition
of tort jury cases in the six-county area.
OPTIMUM DISPOSITION TIME
The original optimum disposition time for tort jury cases in the
Order in the Courts study was set at 30 weeks, or seven months. This
was the time taken by the Portage County Court to dispose of its median
case, that is, the case in the middle of the group of cases arranged in
15 29 Ohio St. 2d. XLV (1972). Stated effective date is September 30, 1971, antedating
release of the text of The Rules in 44 Ohio Bar 1289, October 25, 1971, and
presenting a problem in retrospectivity of application. The most frequently mentioned
date for compliance with particular rules is January 1, 1972.
16 The Rules themselves do not impose a particular time requirement for civil cases as
does Rule 8(B) for criminal cases. Rule 5 refers to the period of time specified by(reporting) Form A, and Form A, published with the Rules, imposes a "norm" of
twenty-four months for personal injury cases.
17 The time of the median case for all types of dispositions was actually shown as
28 weeks or six and a half months from filing to disposition. ORDE R1n THE CouRTs,
supra note 1, at 35.
Fall, 19731
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ascending order of the time taken for their disposition, from the 1966
case samples.18 But some of the detail of the Knight Foundation report
indicated that, even for that year, there were weaknesses in case handling.
Summit, Mahoning, Stark, Trumbull, even Cuyahoga counties showed a
few cases more quickly disposed of than the best of the Portage times, 9
and the median time for disposition in a few modes of termination, such
as defaults and dismissals, was less in both Trumbull and Cuyahoga
counties. 20 As samples were extended backward in time, it became
apparent that the overall Portage County disposition record had
deteriorated seriously from 1961, its best year. In that year, while the
disposition time for the median case was only a few weeks less,
the overall performance record was a disposition of 97 per cent of all
cases in 12 months, or an average monthly disposition rate of 7.7
per cent against 90 per cent dispositions in slightly more than 20
months, or 4.6 per cent per month in the 1966 sample. 21
The Knight Foundation report suggested that the Portage record
was the best then available in northeastern Ohio because that county was
the least populated of those studied and the relative absence of some
metropolitan problems gave it some special advantage. But as comparable
samples were taken and measured in other states, it became apparent
that the Portage performance, however superior it may have been to the
other Ohio counties studied, was not only inferior to that of similarly
situated counties, such as Sullivan County, Tennessee,2 2 and Calcasieu
and Rapides parishes, Louisiana,2 3 but it was distinctly poorer than the
record achieved in such population centers as Jacksonville and Orlando,
18 Observed median time for settled cases was 25 weeks, for dismissed cases 36
weeks, and for tried cases 56 weeks. Id. at 33.
19 Id. at 33-34 (Tables).
20 Id.
21 See Table I following text at p. 8 ante.
22 See chart, Appendix to Final Report, The Judicial System of Tennessee, hIA, pt. 2
at 5, 1971. Tort jury dispositions in Circuit Court in Sullivan County showed the
median case disposed of in five months, 70 per cent in seven months and 85 per cent
in 11 months. See note 14, supra.
23 In Calcasieu Parish (Lake Charles) 58 per cent of cases were disposed of within
eight months, 70 per cent in 10 months and 91 per cent in 15 months. In Rapides
Parish (Alexandria) 40 per cent of the cases were disposed of within five months and
65 per cent within eight months. Thereafter, production fell off sharply. The 70 per
cent disposition level was not reached until 20 months elapsed time from filing.
See note 14, supra.
[Vol. 7:1
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 7 [1974], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol7/iss1/3
ORDER IN Tim COURTS RE srrED
Florida,24 Memphis, Nashville, Knoxville and Chattanooga, Tennessee,2S
and possibly Scranton, Pennsylvania.
26
The first lesson for the Order in the Courts survey was one that
had been freely predicted at the outset of the survey leading to the
report. The declared goal of matching the time span of the most
expeditious of six northeastern Ohio counties was a narrow and parochial
as well as an unrealistic one. The goal should, of course, be set at the
performance of the most expeditious court operating under the same
or similar conditions of population ratio to judges, or case load to
judges, and for northeastern Ohio the target times should have been those
achieved by Jacksonville, Florida, Chattanooga, Tennessee, or Kingsport-
Bristol, Tennessee, not those of Kent-Ravenna, Ohio.
DISPOSITIONAL PROGRESS 1966-68
The Knight report, while published in 1970, dealt with dispositions
of cases filed in the year 1966. For that period there was no doubt of the
relative superiority of the Portage County performances despite occasional
instances of its falling below the record of other counties in some phases
of the case processing, and despite its decline in efficiency from earlier
years. The performance comparison is best demonstrated by the progress
lines of the various counties shown in Table III. Medina County was later
substituted for Stark County in the comparisons because of some hostility
by the Stark County judges to the idea of performance comparisons and
because disabling illness of one of the Stark judges was, for later years in
the ongoing study, a decided disadvantage to the Stark County court. On
the comparative graph, the six counties are shown from left to right
in order of their 1966 recorded relative performance.
24 The Jacksonville (Duvall County) performance was almost incrediblel Forty-five
per cent of dispositions were within three months, 52 per cent in four months, 73 per
cent in five months and 90 per cent in seven months for the 1969 filing year. The
1970 filing year performance was somewhat less spectacular. In Orange County
(Orlando) the time spans were measured only for the 1970 filing year and showed 45
per cent dispositions in eight months, 60 per cent in nine months, 82 per cent in a
year and 97 per cent in 18 months. See note 14, supra.
25 Memphis (Shelby County) on its 1969 tort filings showed 50 per cent dispositions
in six months and 78 per cent in 16 months. Nashville (Davidson County) showed
50 per cent dispositions in seven months and 80 per cent in a year. Chattanooga
(Hamilton County) showed 50 per cent dispositions in less than six months and 90
per cent in 10 months. The graph of its performance relative to other local courts is
shown in Table III, 14 Wm. & MARY L. REv. at 18. The Knoxville (Knox County)
performance is shown in graph form for comparison in Table IV, at page 16. All
charted performances are shown in Appendix to Final Report, The Judicial System
of Tennessee, IJA, 1971.
26 The Scranton (Lackawanna County) record is computed from average time to trial
as reported in the 1969 Calendar Status Studies and is suspect as being markedly less
than for other Pennsylvania counties. The local court administrator did not report
information to the IJA studies in 1971 and 1972.
Fall, 1973]
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Nevertheless, when the continuing study for later years was made,
the 1968 case samples showed Summit County, not Portage, in leadership
position. Between 1966 and 1968 the Summit performance improved
tremendously. In the latter year, half the Summit tort cases were completed
within nine months, 60 per cent within a year and 90 per cent within
two years. By comparison, Portage took 11 months to complete half its
cases and 16 months for 60 per cent dispositions (see Table IV). After
that level was reached, the Portage production fell off sharply, with very
little progress shown in completing the last 20 per cent of cases.
Mahoning County also experienced a decline in effectiveness, but it was
somewhat more modest than that in Portage and noticeable primarily, like
Portage's, in the very late stages of disposition, affecting the final 20 per
cent of the sample. Medina's record was, like Summit's, vastly improved,
although its 1966 record was so poor that even a vast improvement
did not bring it in close touch with the three leaders in dispositions.
Of the remaining counties, the Cuyahoga performance declined slightly
and that of Trumbull quite sharply. The relative record for that year
is shown in Table IV.
Downstate, in the few counties compared on the basis of 1966 and
1968 performance, the results varied much the same way. Franklin
(Columbus) improved measurably over its 1966 performance in the
early stages of processing, but began to lag in its dispositions once
the median case in point of time span had been reached.
2 7 Hamilton's
(Cincinnati) 1968 performance was much less impressive than its 1966
performance had been.28 It is thus somewhat unfortunate that the filing
year of 1968 rather than 1966 was selected as the basis for a composite
progress line of the 12 Ohio counties compared with the composite
progress lines of representative counties in other states based primarily
on their 1969 filing year record. For the Ohio courts showed up very
poorly in the comparison, ranking below five of the six other states
in time required to dispose of their median jury cases. It was not
until comparisons of the time required to dispose of 80 per cent of
the cases are shown that the Ohio courts ranked as high as a poor
third (see Table II), and this was only because, in two of the other
states, there are no means available to do the elementary housecleaning
of disposing of the 30 per cent of cases filed without any intention of
trying or otherwise disposing of them.
27 Comparative performance is shown in Table IV, 14 WM. & MARY L. Rav. at 34.
The 70 per cent disposition level was reached in 30 months for 1966 filings, and not
until 34 months from 1968 filings.
28 For the filing year 1966, the Hamilton County court disposed of its median case in
30 months and reached 70 per cent disposition level at 24 months. For filing year
1968, it took 15 months for the median case and 33 months for 70 per cent
dispositions. See note 14, supra.
11
France: Order in the Courts Revisited
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1974
AKRON LAW REI iEW
0
o z
S0
-0
0 0
Z ZM GO
E4
94 z
04 0
pq Q
0
dO ISSOdSIj HIdIVS NI SHISVO do DVJNJad
0-Zo
2.4
00
0<
0
lz
z
[Vol. 7:1
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 7 [1974], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol7/iss1/3
ORDER IN THE COURTS REVISITED
1970 THE DISASTER YEAR
Poor as the 1968 filing year performance record for the six counties
in northeastern Ohio and six other downstate counties was, the 1970
record was far worse. Summit County slipped badly, from a time span of
nine months to dispose of its median case, to a low of 15 months.
2 9
Portage slipped further, from 14 months to 17 months for its median
disposition.3 0 Mahoning County fell, yet only from 12 to 13 months for
its median disposition.
3 1 Trumbull County went from 24 to 31 months,
32
Cuyahoga from 23 to 26 months.
33 Medina County, the added starter in
the comparisons, increased the time span for disposition of its median
case from 21 months to 29 months.
3 4 The record from downstate counties
also showed considerable slippage from the 1966 and 1968 standard of
performance. Hamilton County (Cincinnati) which had achieved 50 per
cent dispositions in 13 months in 1966 and 15 months to achieve the
same level in 1968, had not even achieved that level of disposition 20
months after the filing date of its 1970 sample.
35 Montgomery County
(Dayton) which had disposed of half of its tort filings in 19 months in
1968, took nearly 22 months to achieve the same 
level in 1970.36
Similarly, Clark County (Springfield), which had disposed of its median
case in slightly over two years in its 1968 filings, had not even disposed of
40 per cent of them in the same time span from the 1970 filing list.
37 Tiny
29 For filing year 1970, Summit County showed 45 per cent dispositions in 14
months, 54 per cent in 15 months, 61 per cent in 16 months and 70 per cent in 19
months. See note 14, supra.
30Portage County showed 49 per cent dispositions in 17 months, 53 per cent at 18
months, 60 per cent in 21-plus months, 70 per cent at 23 months and 80 per cent at
28 months from the early spring sample; 52 per cent in 13-plus months, 70 per cent
in 20 months and 27 per cent in 28 months from the fall sample. See note 14, supra.
31 Mahoning County for this filing year showed 48 per cent dispositions in 12 months,
51 per cent in 13 months, 60 per cent in 18 months and 76 per cent in 21 months.
See note 14, supra.
32 Trumbull County's 1970 sample showed 45 per cent dispositions in 30 months, 58
per cent in 32 months and 61 per cent in 33 months. See note 14, supra.
33 Cuyahoga County's 1970 filing year dispositions from the samples taken were 48
per cent in 25 months, 61 per cent in 26 months and 70 per cent in 30 months.
See note 14, supra.
34 The Medina County sample showed 48 per cent dispositions at 28 months, 52 per
cent at 29 months and 58 per cent at 32 months. No further dispositions were shown
as of April 2, 1973, from this sample. See note 14, supra.
35 The 20-month disposition level was 44 per cent reached in March, 1972. No further
progress check was made after that date in Hamilton County. See note 14, supra.
36The Montgomery County 1970 sample showed 48 per cent dispositions in 21
months, 54 per cent in 23 months and 64 per cent in 24 months. See note 14, supra.
37 Only 36 per cent of filings from the Clark County 1970 spring sample had been
disposed of by April 7, 1972, the last progress check date. See note 14, supra.
Fall, 19731
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Harrison County (Cadiz) which disposed of its median 1968 case in 13
months, took nearly twice as long to reach the same level of disposition in
its 1970 filings.38 Only in Franklin County (Columbus) 39 and Columbiana
County (Lisbon) 40 was the 1968 record of approximately 24 months for
disposition of the median case maintained for the 1970 filings.
Only a few scattered samples were taken for the filing year 1971, with
mixed results. Portage County dispositions were again down, with a new
local record of 19 months required for disposition of the median case.
Mahoning County slipped, also to 19 months for its median case
disposition. 4' Summit County made up part of the loss in the disaster
year, reaching 10 months for its median disposition. 42 In Trumbull and
Medina counties the performance on 1971 filed cases was roughly equal
to that on the 1968 ones.43 But Cuyahoga's performance, after a slow
start, exceeded all previous performances after the first year of pendency
of the 1971 samples was reached.44
In addition to civil cases the filing year 1970 was also a disaster year
for the criminal process. In four of five Order In The Courts counties
the time span from indictment or arraignment to date of trial or plea of
guilty increased markedly between 1967, the survey year, and 1970. This
decline was particularly marked in Portage County, where the Kent State
38The median case in Harrison was reached in slightly less than 24 months, but the
list of cases recorded was extremely short-12 cases covering all filings from April
through September, 1970. See note 14, supra.3 9 The complete record of Franklin County filings to April, 1972, is shown in Table
II1, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. at 34.
40 The Columbiana County record was actually better for 1970 filings after the median
case was reached. Seventy per cent dispositions were recorded within 25 months as
against 38 months for the same level of dispositions for the 1968 filings. The number
of cases used in both years was small (less than 20) and extended over a three-month
period. See note 14, supra.
41 In both cases, the time at which the median case was reached extended through
1972 into 1973. For the relative Portage record, see Table I in text at p. 8.
42The Summit County performance was still slightly short of its 1968 filing yearperformance during the balance of 1971 and most of 1972, but it did overtake the1968 case record at the 80 per cent disposition level, at 20 months of pendency,during the early part of 1973. The systems change discussed infra, p. 9, undoubtedly
had some effect on this later performance. See note 14, supra.
43 During the years 1971 and 1972, the progress of the 1971 sample was slower than
that of the former year. It was not until 1973 that the median case was reached at21 months for Medina and 24 months for Trumbull County. See note 14, supra.The systems change, see note 42, undoubtedly affected these performances also.
"The median case for 1971 samples was reached in 17 months, but in the fall of1972, after a jump in production which coincided with the effect of the Rules
of Superintendence (September 30, 1971). See note 14, supra.
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University shootings and subsequent special grand jury activities acted as a
whipping boy to explain away all deficiencies.
45 In Summit County it was
also marked, but without any visible scapegoat.
46 This was also true in
Cuyahoga County.47 In Stark County,
48 where the previous standard had
been a high one, the decline was so small as to be scarcely noticeable.
Finally, in Mahoning County
49 there was actually some improvement
in time span.
The decline in efficiency, as measured by plotting the disposition of
individual tort jury and criminal cases, was not actually observed until late
1971 and early 1972, and was not published until late 1972. Accordingly,
there could be no considered analysis of the reasons for it until after that
time. But there were other indicators, not as accurate, but indicating a
trend, available earlier, as soon as the year-end statistics published by the
Administrative Director of the Ohio Courts were released.
One indicator is the relationship between the number of pending
cases at the end of the year and the number of cases disposed of in that
year. The quotient of pending cases, or backlog divided by average
monthly dispositions, is sometimes referred to as "statistical delay," or 
the
number of months it would theoretically take to reach the last pending
case, if all cases were disposed of in order of filing.
50 For civil cases, on
a statewide basis, this figure rose from 15.6 months in 1969 to 15.8
45 This cry was so loud that the year 1969, rather than 1970, was selected 
as the
comparison year. In 1967, 53 per cent of criminal cases went from indictment 
to trial
or plea in four weeks, and 69 per cent in nine weeks. By 1969, it took 
seven weeks to
bring the median case to trial or plea, and 24 weeks for 67 per cent of 
them. The
calculated time of the median case, measured from arrest to sentence, 
was nearly 53
weeks, as against 42 weeks in 1967. Portage County, with a continuingly 
high number
of cases pending which results from unapprehended defendants, always 
shows a much
longer calculated than measured delay. See ORDER IN THE CouRTS, supra 
note 1,
at 101.
46 The calculated time span of the median case from arrest to sentence increased 
from
29 weeks in 1967 to 35.88 weeks in 1970. The time from indictment to trial 
for the
median case increased from six weeks in 1967 to 10 weeks in 1970. See note 
14, supra.
47 The count for comparison in Cuyahoga County was taken in the year 1968, 
based
on Table IX, of the studies of Lewis Katz, JUSTICE IS THE CRIME. In 1967, it 
took
nine weeks for the median case to reach trial or plea from indictment, 
in 1968, 14
weeks. In 1967, 70 per cent of cases reached plea or trial in 25 weeks. 
By 1968, it
took 30 weeks to reach the same level. The calculated median time from 
arrest to
sentence in 1967 was 32 weeks; by 1970, it was 44.72 weeks. See note 
14, supra.
4S For the first 65 per cent of dispositions, the time span actually was shorter-nine
weeks in 1970 against 10 weeks in 1967. It was only in the disposition of 
the final
20 per cent of cases that excessive processing times were involved. See note 
14, supra.
49 This improvment consisted of shortening the time span by two or three weeks 
at
almost every 10 percentile of dispositions up to the 80 per cent level which 
was
reached during 1970 in six months. Thereafter, as in Stark County, dispositions
dropped off seriously. See note 14, supra.
50 The calculated measurements, or statistical delay, as the term is used in ORDER 
IN
Tma COURTS, and notes 45-47 supra, is from arrest, not from indictment, to 
final
disposition, or sentence, not the date of trial or plea.
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months in 1970,51 not alarming but bothersome, since most dispositions in
tort jury cases are in the second and third years after filing. But for
criminal cases, the statistical delay rose from 5.88 months in 1969 to
6.72 months in 1970,52 14 per cent in a single year.
By reference to the backlog growth figures for the entire state, theincreases were truly alarming. The civil case backlog, which had
grown by only approximately 500 cases in 1969, increased by 5,600
cases in 1970, and the criminal backlog, which had also grown in
1969 by only 500 cases, was suddenly increased by 2,700 more
in 1970.51 The danger signals were there.
What caused the disaster is by no means clear. Perhaps it was the
increase in both civil and criminal filings for that year,5 4 much greater
than previous annual increases. Perhaps it was a sudden increase in the
number of criminal cases in which trial was demanded, primarily induced
by recent changes in the personnel of the Supreme Court, which appeared
to make it somewhat more responsive to the claims of constitutional right
by criminal defendants.5 5 Perhaps on the civil side it was the initial
difficulties of Ohio's judges and lawyers in coping with the requirements
of Ohio's then new federalized Rules of Criminal Procedure.56 The
posturings of plaintiffs' negligence counsel and insurance defense counsel
51 The calculated time span for the median personal injury or tort jury case is based
on all civil cases (excluding domestic relations cases) pending at the end of the year,divided by average monthly dispositions of all such civil cases disposed of. Data,
unlike that for criminal cases, is from the statistics of the year following the filing
year. See note 14, supra.
52 The six-county area calculated time for the median case from arrest to sentence was8.52 months or 36.92 weeks. Time of the individual counties (in weeks) was asfollows: Cuyahoga 44.72, Summit 35.88, Stark 13.52, Mahoning 30.68, Trumbull22.88, Portage 26.92. See note 14, supra.
53 Ohio Courts, 1970 Annual, Administrative Director, Supreme Court of Ohio.
54 The total filings in civil and criminal cases (disregarding domestic relations)
amounted to 59,538 cases in 1968, 61,088 in 1969. In 1970 the figure jumped to70,843. Even after a two-year lapse, the year 1972 produced only an increase
to 76,419. See note 14, supra.
55 Justice Zimmerman, who had written original opinion in State v. Lindway, 131Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 470 (1936), rejecting the exclusionary rule for Ohio and wholater wrote opinion in State v. Beck, 175 Ohio St. 73, 191 N.E.2d 825 (1963),
again rejecting it in the face of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), died inJune of 1969. Chief Justice Taft, who confirmed Ohio's opposition to the exclusionary
rule by opinions in State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E.2d 387 (1960), andState v. O'Connor, 6 Ohio St.2d 169, 217 N.E.2d 685 (1966), and whose opinion inState v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), virtually emasculated thestate's liberal post-conviction remedy statute, died in March, 1970. His successor,the present Chief Justice, was immobilized as a result of serious heart attack sixweeks later, while attending a Sixth Circuit Conference in Gatlinburg, Tennessee, thusdepriving the Court of months of effective leadership in a new direction, during the
early period of effectiveness of the new Ohio Rules of Civil Procdure.
56 The Rules became effective July 1, 1970.
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in fighting or preparing to fight the introduction of no-fault insurance
might conceivably have had something to do with it.
But whatever the cause and whatever the danger signals heeded, the
Ohio Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice O'Neill,
acted to redress the situation. On September 30, 1971, it adopted Rules
of Superintendence 57 designed to enforce faster disposition of both
civil and criminal cases, but especially the latter, in the common pleas
courts of the state, effective January 1, 1972.
STRUCTURE AND METHOD CHANGES PRODUCED
BY THE RULES OF SUPERINTENDENCE
While the Rules of Superintendence consisted of 13 numbered
commands to the common pleas judges of the state, reinforced by a
55-page implementation manual issued by the Ohio Legal Center and five
detailed prescribed reporting forms, the main elements of the changes
producd were three. First, criminal divisions of the court where they
existed (primarily in the metropolitan counties) were abolished, although
the domestic relations divisions were continued; all non-domestic civil
and all criminal cases in the common pleas courts were required to be
assigned at their inception equally among all general duty judges who
were made responsible for their progress until terminated. Second, the
duty of reporting on intake and disposition cases was transferred from
the clerks and court administrators to each individual judge, with an
administrative judge in all multi-judge courts required to submit
an inclusive or composite report from the reports of the individual judges
in his court. Third, the cases were categorized by type more fully than had
previously been the case. "Norms" were set forth for pendency of various
categories of cases, that for personal injury cases being 24 months. As to
any classification of case, the judges were required to dismiss for want
of prosecution all cases in which no activity had occurred for six
months, except those cases awaiting assignment for trial.58
There were, initially, two matters which could give rise to confusion
as outlined in the rules and the incorporated forms. One was a provision,
explained in the implementation manual, and carried on the form
itself, which counted among the cases "terminated" during any given
period, those transferred to another court or to another judge of the same
court.59 Of course, it seemed fair for a judge to strike off the list of
pending cases assigned to him one for which he was no longer responsible,
but to consider the case as one terminated is rather questionable even for
57 44 Ohio Bar 1289 (1971).
58 Rule 7, Rules of Superintendence.
59 Form A, carrying this subdivision of terminations and definition of accessions, had
not been changed as of June, 1973.
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that judge. Consequently, when all cases transferred to other judges of the
same court are listed in the composite report for that court as terminations
of the court, the accuracy of the court is seriously diminished. Apparently,
the separate judges were supposed to assume that any cases transferred to
them were to be counted as a new filing, but the original language of the
reporting form A failed to convey that idea. It asked for only two sets of
numbers as to accessions to the docket of each judge: "Cases assigned
to me and pending on the first day of the period"; and "Cases filed and
assigned to me during this period, including reactivated criminal cases."
6
At some later time, the judges were apparently instructed to count the
transferred case as a new case in their hands, but how long the practice
went on of not counting them is unknown, and how much this double
counting of filings, when it did occur, disturbed the ratio of pending to
truly terminated cases is likewise undetermined. In any event, the volume
produced by transfers of this sort is not inconsiderable. In Summit County,
in the short month of February, 1973, more than 30 per cent of all
"terminations" were accomplished by transfers to another judge or court.61
The other confusion was created by the use of the term "norm." Does
this mean the maximum time any case in a given category is to be
permitted to remain pending without suitable explanation? Plain English
would not appear to indicate that anything further was meant than that
this was the normal time a case of that category should be expected to
remain pending and that no special effort should be made to expedite it
before that time. But considering the wide range of time spans encountered
in personal injury or tort cases, it is difficult to conceive of the "norm" as
anything but a median time or an average time; in either case, pendency
of up to three and a half years for some cases might be considered within
normal limits. Both Superintendence Rule 5 and Form A for reporting of
the judges use the term without explanation, and the implementation
manual, which goes to great lengths to explain the meaning of median,
mean and mode, is strangely silent on the meaning of the term "norm."
Based on experience elsewhere, three general effects on case
processing could be expected from the imposition of the Rules of
Superintendence. The first of these was induced by distributing all civil
and criminal cases among the judges and then applying different time
"norms" to criminal, personal injury and general civil cases. To the extent
that criminal cases were taking longer than the six-month "norm" allowed
for them (prior research had demonstrated that the bulk of them did not),
60 Form A, Rules of Superintendence with Implementation Manual.
61 The number was unusually high because two judges left the bench within the same
month, one with a high, the other a low, number of pending cases. The number was
equalized among their successors by transferring a number of cases from one judge's
docket to the other's. In this particular instance, the cases so transferred were counted
as new filings by the transferee judge.
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pressure was on each judge to attack his assigned criminal cases as an
order of first priority, letting the general civil and personal injury cases
pile up, if necessary, in order to make the criminal calendar "current."
Second priority, with a one-year "norm," went to the general civil
cases, contract and equity.62 The third and lowest priority was assigned
to personal injury cases with a 24-month "norm." 63 The logical inference
was that in case of choice to be exercised, the general civil calendar
would be reduced to a one-year pendency before the personal injury, or
tort jury, cases became an item of real concern. This effect can be
labeled "criminal case preference."
The second general effect was induced by the requirements of Rule 7
for a file review quarterly, although weakened by the provision that the
duty can be delegated by the judge.64 All cases were to be reviewed,
presumably in a variable time with three months as a maximum. Here
it would be expected, at the outset, that some civil cases in which default
had occurred, or in which service of process had not been made, would
show up as the cases were examined in the file review by the judge at the
time of mass assignment of the cases to him. As such cases were detected,
pressure could be applied to attorneys for the plaintiffs to terminate them
by default hearing and judgment or by voluntary dismissal as the case
might be. Such an effect, called the inventory effect, had been noted in
many preceding changeovers from master calendar control to the
individual judges' docket system, notably by some federal courts and
in Franklin County (Columbus) Ohio in 1971.6 As a device to boost
terminations among relatively current cases, it would presumably have
unequal effects in counties which were already on individual docket
systems, such as Mahoning and Trumbull, and those which had to
change systems, such as Cuyahoga and Summit. How long this inventory
effect would persist was not really known.
A third effect, related somewhat to the second, was what might be
referred to as the "housecleaning effect," induced also by Rule 7, requiring
dismissal of inactive cases after six months of inactivity and by Rule 5,
requiring the reporting with a clear threat of the military "reply by
endorsement" as to cases which exceeded the norm. The effect of the
combination of these rules in disposing of old personal injury cases is one
62 There are two other categories of civil cases, both small in number: Workman's
Compensation, with a norm of one year for disposition, and Appropriation (eminent
domain) with a norm of six months.
63 No norm is set for domestic relations cases, but courts having a separate domestic
relations division are required to report the age of their median terminated contested
and uncontested cases.
64 Dismissal of cases. Each judge of a court of common pleas shall review or cause
to be reviewed quarterly all cases assigned to him... Rule 7. Rules of Super-
intendence, 7.
6 5See comparison graph in 14 WM. & MARY L. Ray. at 34.
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which might not be measured by time in process studies of samples of
relatively current cases because, initially at least, it would affect only the
old cases on the docket, beginning with the oldest and longest forgotten
case, once churned up in the process of the initial assignment or discovered
by a successor judge. But such an effect would be reflected more in the
recapitulation of total filings and terminations of each judge as reported to
the Chief Justice and duly recorded in the state's operating statistics.
CHANGES IN DISPOSITION TIME PRODUCED BY THE RULES
Four methods of testing the effects of the Rules of Superintendence on
the time span of tort jury (and criminal) cases have been developed and
used. Since the Rules had been in effect only a little more than 16 months
at the time of preparation of this article, it was obvious that the full-scale
method of tracing the progress of samples drawn from post-April filings
of the tort jury cases would not result in a long enough observation period
for showing fully developed results and conclusions. Therefore, other
methods had to be implemented. The first of these methods available was
to measure the continuing progress of disposition of cases filed in 1970,
and of some cases in 1971, to see if there was any pronounced change in
the disposition rate vis-A-vis dispositions of earlier years on earlier samples
of the same age. A pronounced change in disposition rate after January
1, 1972, could also be detected on the same samples. A second method
was to be guided by interim reports of the Chief Justice as to successes
gained. Another was to take new, 1972, samples on the former basis, for
both tort jury and criminal cases, but to change the sample date from
April to January in order to permit a longer observation time of the case
disposition process. In making this change, in time of the sample drawing,
some slight difference in known early disposition rates had to be
accepted. Finally, and of chief reliance because of the known previous
relationship between "statistical delay" and the time span of the median
case in disposition time, the Annual Report of the Administrative Director
was relied upon to furnish its usual accurate statistics on the number
of cases of each class pending at the end of the year and total terminations
for the year, from which the statistical delay and hence the median
time span could be computed.66 These results could then be used to
check against the observed results.
Progress on Older Cases
The first and most convenient means of checking the progress of
the 1970-1971 case samples was in the disposition rate change after the
imposition of the Rules. This was done not only in the six-county area, but
in other downstate counties, primarily the metropolitan ones, where
continuing studies were being made of tort case disposition times. In
66 See OIDER IN THE COURTS, supra note 1, at 35, 36, 101.
[Vol. 7:1
20
Akron Law Review, Vol. 7 [1974], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol7/iss1/3
ORDER 1n THE COURTS R visrrED
most, but not all, of the counties observed, there was a marked jump
in disposition rate for approximately a month's time, either just before or
just after the Rules became effective, followed by a relapse to the former
progress rate attributable to cases of that age group as established in
former years. The jump was not entirely unexpected and was ascribed
to "inventory effect" as the judges reviewed the files assigned to them. This
same jump had occurred in Franklin County a year earlier when it
changed from master calendar to individual judges' docket system but was
not repeated in 1972.67 It was considerably less pronounced in Mahoning
and Trumbull counties where the individual judges' docket had been in
effect for many years prior to the imposition of the Rules. In downstate
counties, the study of relative disposition rate was pursued for only four
months, but in the six-county area, it continued for an additional
year. The additional year of observation produced no indication of any
permanent change in rate of disposition of these cases from the rate
established in former years. In some counties in the Order in the Courts
study area, the progress rate actually declined, but on the composite
comparative graph shown later in this article, the 1971 samples, after an
initial surge of activity, almost exactly paralleled the progress lines from
the 1968 and 1970 cases, and were somewhat lower in pitch, and
therefore slower in progress rate than those from 1966.
The results of this study, limited in time as to the downstate
counties, were not surprising. Predictably, there was some inventory
effect, but it was both stronger for a short time and of more limited
duration than expected. In general, it confirmed the expectation that the
long range thrust of the Rules would be on expediting the process of the
criminal cases, rather than the tort jury ones, but no sample of criminal
cases then existed to confirm the other portion of this expectation.
The Chief Justice's Reports and Predictions
In former years, monthly rough checks on the progress of the courts
in disposing of cases, in terms of comparison of numbers of cases filed
and numbers terminated, had been supplied by monthly reports of the
Administrative Director of the Courts. While this was sometimes jokingly
referred to as "playing the numbers" game, 68 and had of itself no direct
relationship to speed of disposition, it did furnish some check to see if
cases were being temporarily stalled or expedited in various counties
of the state. But during the year 1972, the publication of this data for the
common pleas courts was suspended and the only source of statistical
data was in the progress reports issued by the Chief Justice of the
67 ORDR iN THE CouRTs, supra note 1, at 33.
68 Comments of Judge LoPresti, Cuyahoga County, Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 1,
1973, and of Chief Justice O'Neill, State of the Judiciary Message, 46 Ohio Bar 755,
at 765. Neither judge appeared jocular in the comments.
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state. These reports began in mid-May, 1972, and continued through
the fall of that year. They were concerned with the progress of individual
judges, not of courts as a whole, and then only with the number of cases
that particular judge disposed of, without relation to the number filed and
assigned to him or the number filed, assigned to, and disposed of by his
colleagues on the same bench. This was, of course, good exhortive tactics,
stressing one of the features of the individual judges' docket system: a
spirit of friendly competition engendered among judges to see which could
exceed the other in numbers of dispositions alone. Special commendations
were issued to judges who showed disposition of more than a prescribed
number of cases during each of the first three quarters of the year.
One weakness of such emphasis on terminations alone, apart from
the fact that no distinction was made as to types, court, age, or disposition
of cases, was that it was only one-half of the "numbers game"
terminations. There was no indication of how the terminations related to
filings and, consequently, a judge commended for number of terminations
could actually be losing or gaining ground in terms of his backlog of
number of pending cases awaiting disposition.69 Reports of individual
courts, such as Cuyahoga County, published in local newspapers, did
supply some of the additional answers. Thus, individual dispositions for
the first six months of 1972, ranging from 568 cases by two judges
to 226 for another, were reported, together with the information
that the Cuyahoga County Court, as a whole, had disposed of more
than 10,500 cases in six months, while 8,400 new ones were being
filed, for a backlog reduction of 2,100 cases.
70
Beginning in the early part of 1973, as the final yearly reports of the
judges, and particularly the administrative judges of the metropolitan
courts, were received in Columbus and tabulated, the thrust of the
Chief Justice's reports did change. Delivered generally by press releases
and speeches at service clubs and local bar associations, they began to
emphasize the excess of terminations over filings or backlog reduction
by whole courts rather than by individual judges. The theme now was that
the excess of terminations or backlog reduction consisted of more than
9,000 cases for the state as a whole and 3,700 cases in Cuyahoga County
alone. This latter figure would, of course, accord with the one previously
given out by the Cuyahoga County Court noted above, although since it
was less than double that of the first six months, reduction there was some
indication that the inventory effect had worn off and that housecleaning
was becoming more difficult. Shortly thereafter, the administrative judge
69 See experience of Clark and Marion counties, as noted by the Chief Justice, 46
Ohio Bar at 763 (1973).
70 Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 31, 1972, at 11A.
[Vol. 7:1
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 7 [1974], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol7/iss1/3
ORDER iN THE COURTS REvlSrrED
of Cuyahoga County released the court's year-end figures.7' They showed
a backlog reduction, not of 3,700 cases, but of only 2,652, an indication
that housecleaning was getting even more difficult. But both of these
individual court reports did give some clue to the type of activity their
judges engaged in by reporting the beginning and ending pendency or
backlog figures for the year, which showed the 2,652 cases as a net
difference. Unfortunately, the beginning backlog figure for 1972 did
not tally with the backlog figure reported to the Administrative Director
for his 1971 Summary as an end of the year figure; his newspaper report
showed 2,256 more cases pending than had been previously reported.7 2
Thus, all but about 400 cases involved in the backlog reduction were
those "discovered" in the inventory process. Assuming that such cases
actually existed and were not mere phantoms, it was clear that they
were of a type that all concerned had previously considered disposed
of, and that little effort was required to terminate them of record. In
addition, such cases were obviously of the housecleaning type, that is
old, long-forgotten cases whose disposition would have no effect
whatsoever on the time span of the mass of the tort jury cases filed within
currently measured periods, except as they might affect the duration of
the "average" case of that type. In a Law Day speech at Cleveland, 73 the
Chief Justice adopted the slight change in Cuyahoga County figures,
repeated his previous claim of statewide case reduction of 9,600 cases
and predicted, as he had before, that all dockets would be current in
terms of the norm times for various types of cases by Labor Day, 1973.
Unfortunately, from studying figures quoted as the reduction of total
composite backlog, with unknown quantities of civil and criminal cases
making up the mix, it still could not be determined whether a greater
portion of the reduction was in civil or criminal cases. 74 Still less could
it be determined how this was affecting the time in progress of the
current cases, since many of the cases so terminated might be out of
the mainstream of litigation, waiting for termination by notice and a
journal entry, as in a typical housecleaning of old, forgotten cases. To
clear up this particular point, it was necessary to resort to the time-lapse
measurement device, this time on 1972 filings.
71 Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 1, 1973.
72See Ohio Courts, 1971 Summary, 10, 14, showing total of 19,735 civil and criminal
cases pending at the close of 1971. Pendency reported by the administrative judge at
the opening of 1972 was 22,081 cases. Id.
73 Supra, note 71 at 14A.
74 This was clarified in the State of the Judiciary Message delivered May 16, 1973,
but not reported until May 28, 1973, 46 Ohio Bar 755 (1973).
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Measurement of 1972 Filings
For measurement of the 1972 case progress, it was necessary to take
samples of 1972 filings untainted by contact with the old system. But it
was manifestly impractical to take April and May case filings for
measurement in the tort jury field since, in the smaller counties, some
filings would be measured from June, 1972, only, too short a period of
time to elapse until May, 1973, when results had to be tabulated. Decision
was, therefore, made to take a January sample, stretching back into early
December, 1971, in the smaller counties, to permit maximum observation
time. In three of the counties, observation continued to March, 1973, with
the remainder running until May. Since the shift in date would give the
1972 samples the advantage of slightly faster seasonal movement,
75 it
was felt that there could be no complaint that the Rules system was
being compared under any but the most favorable conditions.
As to the tort jury cases, the dispositions in Summit County were
significantly less for the 1972 cases than for the 1971 and 1968 cases,
although some improvement over 1970 was shown.
76 In Mahoning
County, the 1972 filing year record was distinctly poorer in producing
dispositions than that of 1971, 1970 or 1968.7
7 In Trumbull County,
the dispositions were approximately equal to those of the 1971 filing year
sample, but substantially below the rate on 1970 and 1968 cases.
78 In
Cuyahoga County, the 1972 rate was superior to both the 1968 and 1970
rate, approximately equal to the 1966 and 1971 rates and somewhat below
the 1965 rate.79 In Portage County, the simplified comparison chart shown
in Table I demonstrates that the 1972 rate, while slightly above the 1970
and 1971 achievement, was distinctly inferior to that of all prior years, and
that progress under the Rules had merely redressed the decline from the
disaster year of 1970, without restoring tort dispositions to their relatively
good rate of 1966 and 1968 or the excellence of 1961 and 1962. A
composite comparative line graph covering progress in the years 1966
through 1972 in disposition rate is shown in Table V for the six counties
and indicates that what has been said concerning Portage County progress,
or lack of it, is generally true for the entire Order In The Courts area.
75 See note 14, supra.
76 Comparison graphs of Summit County showed its dispositions at every 10 percentile
of cases disposed taking approximately one month longer than for 1966 and two
months longer than for 1971. See note 14, supra.
77 At the end of one year of pendency only 18 per cent of Mahoning's 1972 tort jury
cases had been disposed of. In 1971, 28 per cent had been terminated and in 1966,
1968 and 1970 nearly half of the filings for those years had been disposed within the
same period. See note 14, supra.
78 Trumbull's disposition period at the end of a year of pendency in 1972 filings was
16 per cent, as was 1971's. In 1968 and 1970 dispositions over the same period of
time were over 20 per cent and in 1966 they stood at 42 per cent. See note 14, supra.
79 Cuyahoga's dispositions at the end of a year of pendency varied from 22 to 30
per cent in all years surveyed. See note 14, supra.
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Furthermore, the reporting on progress of tort jury cases, which
conformed to at least half of the prediction of greater criminal case
expedition during the early period of the operation of the Rules, furnished
no indication whatever that the other half of the prediction, greater
celerity in disposition of criminal cases, was occurring. To measure
this, it was necessary to resume a study which had been virtually
abandoned after 1970. Although criminal case processing studies had
occurred in two counties, Summit and Cuyahoga, in both cases it was
for the purpose of checking similarity of results with those of other
studies.8 0 Again, it seemed desirable to abandon the April indictments as a
1972 test sample and go to January indictments to allow more time for
observed progress. In three of the counties,81 the observed time span had
been from date of indictment to trial in addition to that from date of
arrest to final disposition in both the Order In The Courts study and in
the later cross checks of other studies. Accordingly, these dates were used
for the 1972 study. In the remaining two counties,8 2 a departure was
made, conformable to the measurement standard introduced by the
Rules, which emphasized the time span from arraignment to trial. The
result was that the measurements of the five counties as to time span
in the criminal process was not the same, and they could not be
compared exactly with each other horizontally. They could only
be compared vertically on a before and after basis.
The measurement showed that Stark, Mahoning and even Portage
counties had shortened their time spans tremendously at every level of the
various levels of disposition.82 In Cuyahoga County, the time taken for
disposing of the first 40 per cent of cases was somewhat longer than that
for 1967 and 1968, but far shorter than for the disaster year 1970.84
80 In mid-1972 the Urban Center, University of Akron, conducted a Criminal Case
Proceeding Study which measured, among other things, time spans for an enlarged
sample of 1970 cases. The results were virtually identical with those plotted on a
much smaller sample of the same year, by the author. A more massive study was
made of the Cuyahoga County 1968 criminal case processing by Professor Lewis Katz
for his book, JusTIcE Is THE CRIME (1972). Table IX in the Appendix thereof
yielded figures from which a disposition of line graph measuring time from arraign-
ment to trial could be plotted as a check on the ORDER IN THE CouRTs 1967 figures.
81 Cuyahoga, Summit and Portage. See note 14, supra.
82 Stark and Mahoning. See note 14, supra.
83 While Stark County reached its median case in point of time in seven and a half
weeks from arraignment as against less than seven weeks in 1970, it had reached
trial or plea in 80 per cent of its cases in less than 15 weeks and disposed of all cases
in the sample in 20 weeks, or four and a half months. Mahoning County showed a
median time for plea or trial at five weeks from arraignment against nine weeks in
1970 and 13 weeks in 1967. It reached 80 per cent dispositions in 10 weeks. Portage
County, whose cases were measured from time of indictment, rather than from
arraignment, increasing the time per case by a week and a half, reached its median
case in slightly more than five weeks, 80 per cent dispositions in 10 weeks and 95
per cent in 23 weeks or slightly more than five months. See note 14, szpra
84 Supra, note 78.
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Thereafter, the Cuyahoga County criminal disposition rate improved
rapidly in comparison to all prior years and at the 90 per cent disposition
level, the cases were being tried within 34 weeks or eight months-better
than in all previous years.8S Only in Summit County was there no
improvement shown in this stage of the criminal process, either over
1967 or 1970.86 Summit had shown some improvement in the whole
time span from arrest to disposition, but most progress was made in
shortening the time span at the grand jury level. Of course, this
could not be shown as indicating an improvement occasioned by the
Rules in the time span from arraignment to trial.
Thus the time span of this vital part of the criminal process
emphasized in the Rules, by the measurement devices used before, did
show a marked improvement over the 1970 low point in case processing
and, in a majority of the counties, showed improvement even over the
1967 dispositions. It was noteworthy that both Stark and Portage counties
registered improvement in this portion of the criminal process since, even
in 1967, their median cases had taken only eight and six weeks
respectively from arraignment to trial or plea and, in both cases, the
average times for all cases to reach trial had been 11 weeks.8 7 Thus both
counties were well within the "norm" allowances even before the Rules
were adopted and both bettered their records after adoption. Because this
article is concerned primarily with the tort jury or personal injury
rather than with criminal cases, no year-to-year graphs of performance
are shown as to the latter, but Table VI indicates that even in the
total time span from arrest to sentence, which encompasses a much
longer period of time than that from arraignment to trial, the median
cases in four of the counties were being disposed of in far shorter
than the "norm" allowance.
The evidence from measurement of the five Order In The Courts
counties88 thus indicates what would have been assumed at the outset.
While there had been only a modest increase in the effectiveness of the
courts in handling tort jury cases (the time spans in that field had not by
the close of 1972 even regained the less than desirable 1968 performance
85 The measurement in Cuyahoga County, running like Portage's from indictment,
showed the median case reaching trial or plea in 18 weeks, against nine weeks in 1967
and 15 weeks in 1968, but it reached 80 per cent dispositions of its 1972 sample in
27 weeks or slightly more than six months as compared to 33 weeks for the 1967
cases and 38 weeks for those measured by Katz in the 1968 filings. See note 14, supra.
86 The 1972 Summit County record was actually from one week to one month better
than the 1970 record at all percentiles. It was close to the better 1967 record,
reaching the median case at six weeks, but it did not reach the 80 per cent dispositions
mark until 23 weeks had passed and did not reach 90 per cent dispositions in less
than 36 weeks, or more than eight months after indictment. See note 14, supra.
87 See note 14, supra.
88 Trumbull County was omitted from the later criminal case measurements.
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levels), there had been, in the handling of criminal cases, a marked
improvement in efficiency and a pronounced lowering of time spans from
the low point of 1970 and even some gains over the years 1967 and 1968.
Measurement by Annual Statistics
The 1972 Annual Summary as issued by the Administrative Director
of the Courts in April, 1973, and distributed in May, shortly after the
Chief Justice's accounting in the Cleveland Law Day address,
89 appeared
on its face to be a complete record of the activity of the courts for the
year, as it had for the past 12 years. But despite the fact that it was a
computerized printout, where most of its predecessors
9
" had been the
result of laborious hand work, there were missing features which had been
standard in previous summaries. There were totals for all cases filed, in
each of the new categories established by the Rules;
91 but there were no
totals for the dispositions or terminations. The latter had to be determined
from adding the subtotals showing various modes of disposition which
seemed to correspond to the modes of termination called for on reporting
Form A. There was missing from both the criminal and personal injury
case subtotals any column entitled "Cases terminated by transfer to
another court or judge" which appeared to indicate that the Director
appreciated that such intra-court transfers were not terminations at all
and should be disregarded. In the criminal case subtotals the columns
corresponding to Form A's "termination by reason of pretrial" and "by
unavailability of accused for trial" were missing. But this did not
seem of great concern, since criminal pretrial is not an established
practice in Ohio. And finally the few cases in which a criminal
defendant, after arraignment, "skipped bail" were not terminations at
all, but postponements of accountability, which could easily be shown
by a deduction from the "cases filed" category.
But it was the content of the 1972 Summary which was the great
disappointment. When all subtotals of terminations were added in the
criminal and personal injuries classifications and subtracted from
the filings in those classifications 92 there was a reduction of backlog
shown, to be sure, but the reduction was of only a little more than 2,300
cases, not the 9,600 reported by the Chief Justice.
93 The backlog reduction
89 See note 67, supra.
90 Some of the 1970 Summary was computer printout, as was the 1971 Summary.
91 The categories for the general division consisted of criminal (measured from
arraignment only), personal injury and "other civil," which included not only
contract, equity and perogative writ cases, but also workman's compensation and
appropriation cases for which different norms were established.
92 No calculations were performed on "other civil cases," and it was not even clear
that many of the pronouncements of the Chief Justice and the administrative judge
of Cuyahoga County, prior to May 16, 1973, applied to this category.
93 The Chief Justice later amended the figures downward, to 9,473 cases, specifically
including the "other civil" cases. 46 Ohio Bar 755 (1973).
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in these two categories for the original six-county area was of only 529
cases and for Cuyahoga there was a total reduction of only 130
cases, less than five per cent of the original 2,652 figure reported by
the Chief Justice and that county's administrative judge.94
When these figures were separated into the parts corresponding to
their classification, an even greater shock appeared. There was shown
a reduction in the backlog of personal injury cases, statewide, of 3,837
cases, in the six-county area of 2,695 cases, and in Cuyahoga County
alone of 2,353 cases. 95 While well within the limits of the Chief Justice's
pronouncements, these figures seemed high in relation to the data
produced by the time lapse studies unless the reduction in pending cases
was achieved primarily by the "housecleaning" operation of removing all
old and forgotten cases from the dockets, which would not affect the
disposition of the relatively current cases under measurement.
But the "backlog reduction" achieved in the criminal dockets, as
added from the nearly complete mode of termination subtotals and
subtracted from case filings, gave rise to consternation. There was,
according to the 1972 Summary, no backlog reduction whatsoeverl
Instead, there was a large increase in backlog, in the state by 2,597 added
cases, in the six-county area by 2,503 cases and in Cuyahoga County
alone, by 2,223 cases. If the components of these final figures were
complete or nearly complete and said what they seemed to say, then the
Rules were a complete failure in moving criminal cases. And there was no
hope of achieving currency by Labor Day, 1973, or by any other Labor
Day in the forseeable future. As it applied to the individual counties in
which measurements had been taken, these statistical table results were
at complete variance with the supposed reality of the measurement results.
Only Summit County's addition of 29 cases to its criminal backlog could
be understood. That county had not improved its rather poor performance
over the year 1967, but had even lost currency in that year. The
Cuyahoga County figures, which purported to show that the court had
disposed of only 55 per cent of the number of cases filed in 1972, were
simply unbelievable, and Stark County, which had so much bettered its
excellent 1967 criminal time in process rate, was charged with disposing
of only 72 per cent of the number of cases filed.96
A comparison of the relative picture of time spans of the tort jury
and criminal case progress, as painted by the 1972 Summary figures, is
revealing. If the quotient of year-end pendency divided by average
monthly dispositions roughly approximates the time in months taken to
process the median criminal case from arrest to disposition, and the
9 See note 65, supra.
95 Ohio Courts 1972 Summary, Administrative Director, Supreme Court.
96 Id.
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median tort jury case of the year before from filing to disposition, 7 then
the following is the time span of the median case, both civil (1971) and
criminal (1972), shown by the 1972 Annual Summary:
Unit
State of Ohio . . .
Six-County Area
Cuyahoga County
Summit County
Stark County ..
Mahoning County
Trumbull County
Portage County .
Median Tort Case
. 12.1 months
* 12.9 months
12.96 months
* 11.88 months
14.16 months
9.08 months
* 16.8 months
14.16 months
Median Criminal Case
7.32 months
14.04 months
19.8 months
6.36 months
9.6 months
9.4 months
14.4 months
10.56 months
Not only do these comparisons seem to show that in Cuyahoga and
Mahoning counties, and in the six-county area as a whole, it took longer
to bring a 1972 criminal case from arrest to conviction than a 1971 tort
jury case from filing to disposition, which seems absurd on its face. But
also the criminal case time span, in all counties except Summit, varied
widely from the results established by actual measurement, as follows:
Unit
Cuyahoga County
Summit County
Stark County ...
Mahoning County
Trumbull County
Portage County
Median Case as MeasuredWeeks Months
. . . 32 7.5
. . . 25 5.5
. . . 19 4.0
. . . 22 5.0
. . . 16 3.75
The apparently complete results from the 1972 Summary thus are at
complete variance, not only with the Chief Justice's announced figures,
but with the time spans, at least in criminal cases, as determined by actual
measurements in the six-county area. If the Summary figures are to be
accepted as final and irrevocable, then the criminal case measurements
are completely useless, and the Chief Justice's predictions of criminal
case currency 98 by Labor Day, 1973, completely valueless. Both a
breakdown of the latter's figures into their civil and criminal components
and a determination of what, if any, significant termination figures had
been omitted from the Summary seem in order.
97As previously noted, "statistical delay" is measured for criminal cases by statistics
at the end of the filing year, but for tort jury (personal injury) cases by statistics for
the year after filing. Thus the personal injury case statistics for 1972 related to the
1971 filed cases rather than those for 1972.
98The prediction had been made in many service club and local bar association
speeches and was repeated in the Cleveland Law Day speech. Cleveland Plain Dealer,
May 2, 1973,
Median Case asCalculated
19.8 months
6.36 months
9.6 months
9.4 months
14.4 months
10.56 months
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A PARTIAL RECONCILIATION OF RESULTS
The Chief Justice's figures came first. In his state of the judiciary
speech at the Ohio State Bar Association meeting, Dayton, May 16, 197399
he produced a greater breakdown of docket reduction figures than had
been previously announced. For the first time it became clear that the
previously announced "backlog reduction" figures covered all types of
cases in the general divisions of the common pleas courts, rather than
merely the criminal and personal injury cases which together constituted
only a little more than half of those divisions' business,100 and which had
previously been emphasized in the speeches and reports. As to the personal
injury cases, the state of the judiciary speech showed a docket reduction
of 4,239 cases, well within range of the 3,837 cases shown by the
Administrative Director. Indications, later confirmed, were that he treated
as terminated the fewer than 500 such cases "terminated by transfer to
another judge," which the Administrative Director wisely considered no
terminations at all and which the computer operation had not retrieved
and printed out. In addition, the "other civil" cases constituted approxi-
mately 3,000 cases of the backlog reduction, leaving only approximately
a 2,400 case backlog reduction achieved in the criminal cases.
But the criminal case figures remained at great variance. The Chief
Justice claimed a reduction of backlog, or excess of terminations over
filings, of 2,356 cases statewide. The Summary for the same period showed
an excess of filings over terminations for the same period or a backlog
increase of 2,597 cases. This variance, of nearly 5,000 cases, out of less
than 25,000 cases filed during 1972, was too great to be explained by
elimination of the "cases transferred to another judge" alone, as in the
case of the personal injury case figures. Nor did it seem likely that adding
the cases represented by those who skipped bond after arraignment or
whose cases were terminated as a result of pretrial would go very
far toward making up the difference.
There was thus some initial suspicion that the Administrative
Director's poor criminal disposition figures were a ploy to aid in insuring
that the Court's proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure, pending a second
time before the Ohio General Assembly, would not again be rejected, by
9 9 Supra note 93.
100The 1972 criminal case filings were 24,155; personal injury, 15,506; other civil,
including workman's compensation and appropriation, 35,758. See note 14, supra.
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showing that the existing procedure system was not working well.' 0' This
suspicion was dispelled when the numbers of case terminations eliminated
by non-retrieval in the computer printouts of cases terminated "by
unavailability of accused for trial" and "terminated by reason of pretrial"
were examined. Since the data going into the computer, but not retrieved
by it for printout totals, could not be examined in full, only that from the
six-county study area was used, as collected and supplied by the law clerk
and administrative assistant to the Chief Justice of Ohio, May, 1973. It
was enough, however, to indicate how a reconciliation of the Chief
Justice's and the Administrative Director's figures could be made. The six
counties represent nearly one-third of the population of the state and
slightly more than 35 per cent of its criminal case filings. The reported
terminations in those six counties, in the three categories specified
above, not retrieved by the computer for printouts, totalled nearly 3,500
cases, more than enough extended over the state to make the Chief
Justice's figures correct, so far as the criminal case totals were concerned.
Of these 3,500 cases, only 611 were transfers to other judges and
thus suspect as not representing any real reduction of backlog. The
remaining 2,900 cases, it could be argued, did represent backlog
reductions of one sort or another even if they were not all terminations
in the sense of cases ultimately disposed of.
Of the two remaining sets of unretrieved totals, that represented by
the "cases terminated by reason of pretrial" was the most numerous and
varied. Portage and Mahoning counties showed no such terminations;
Trumbull County showed only 22 such cases. But Cuyahoga County had
1,793 of them, Summit County 131 and Stark 111. It is apparent that
the variations were caused by doubt in the minds of the reporting judges
as to how to treat bargained pleas and other changes of plea on Form
A. The three larger counties, along with Trumbull County, elected to
treat the plea bargaining process as similar to civil pretrial and reported
them accordingly; the other two shied away from the acknowledgement
that plea bargaining exists and reported these bargained pleas as straight
pleas of guilty. Apparently the Administrative Director also felt some
qualms about acknowledging the existence of the bargained plea, so
101The theory was that the Administrative Director's 1972 Summary could be
distributed to the General Assembly committees considering the Criminal Rules as an
indication of how poorly in terms of expedition the existing statutory criminal
procedure was working and how badly the courts needed this procedural tool to
expedite case disposition. This theory collapsed with the publication on May 28 of the
Chief Justice's address to the state bar in which he claimed, with figures, a dramatic
lowering of the criminal case backlog. Undoubtedly more judiciary committee
members read the Ohio Bar than the Ohio Courts' Summaries.
An additional, related theory was that some terminations were deliberately
withheld so that they could be pumped into the statistics after July 1, 1973, to offset
an expected temporary slowdown in the dispositional process as the judges familiarized
themselves with the new procedures, as occurred in 1970 under the then new civil rules.
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he swept these acknowledgments of its existence under the rug of
non-retrieval, to the disadvantage of the record of the counties concerned.
The remaining unretrieved totals, representing 800 cases, were those
declared terminated because the defendants were unavailable for trial.
Under the old accounting system a case was counted as pending in
common pleas court from the time it was certified for probable cause
by the committing magistrate. Under the new system a criminal case was
only counted as pending from the time of arraignment of the defendant
after the return of indictment. If a defendant skipped bond after
arraignment, his case was considered terminated subject to reinstatement
if and when he was apprehended. The termination was therefore not a
disposition, and should have properly been shown as a reduction in the
number of cases filed and assigned to a judge, which would leave
the numerical relationship of filings and dispositions unchanged. But the
percentage of cases terminated by reason of unavailability in the three
largest counties was greatly in excess of the percentage observed in the
sampling process. Hence it was assumed that many of these "no shows"
represented cases of past years on which the reporting courts were
performing a "housecleaning" operation similar to that discussed
hereinbefore in connection with old civil cases. A complicated formula
was therefore used to separate out those cases in the three categories
which were legitimate dispositions from those which were merely
deductions from intake on one hand and those which were pure
deductions from beginning pendency on the other. All "terminations by
reason of pretrial" were allowed as terminations. Of the "transfers," up
to one per cent of the number of cases filed were allowed as terminations,
since they might represent changes of venue, or transfers to a minor
court for ultimate disposition. The rest were added to the number
pending at the end of the period. Of those "unavailable for trial," up
to two per cent of the number of filings were allowed as downward
adjustments of the number of cases filed. The remainder were simply
shown as a deduction from the beginning inventory.
The results of this adjustment showed that Cuyahoga County still
had an excess of filings over terminations for 1972, but of only 275 cases;
Stark and Portage counties of 37 cases each, Trumbull of 14 cases.
Summit and Mahoning counties showed an excess of terminations over
filings, the former of 151 cases, the latter of 17. The six-county area as a
whole showed an increase of criminal case backlog, but of only 175 cases,
and since the remainder of the state had fared reasonably well in the
Administrative Director's too well-trimmed figures, it can be assumed that
in the state at large there was either a very small gain or a very small loss
in currency of criminal cases, statistically speaking, for the year 1972.
While the two sets of statistics were at least partially reconciled,
there was no resolution of the variance created in the year 1972 between
[Vol. 7:1
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"statistical delay" and the time spans shown by sample measurement in
both the tort jury and criminal field. The Chief Justice's thesis obviously
was that if more cases were terminated than filed, then all cases in the
line from filing to adjudication necessarily moved faster, and the greater
the excess of terminations the faster the movement. This is perhaps logical
but a trifle simplistic, if no account is taken of whether or not the cases
terminated are in the mainstream of cases awaiting adjudication.
Thus the "housecleaning" operations in both the tort jury and criminal
fields are likely to have minimal effects on the speed of progress of cases,
and probably almost no effect whatsoever during the first year of a changed
operation. In theory, as the old deadwood gets cleaned out, the judges will
have more time for the more current cases and can push them along faster,
spurred by a constantly decreasing "norm" time which produces earlier
and earlier times for which to account for continued case pendency. 10 2 But
this is an exceedingly long range process. The indications from the
measurements are that shortening of time span has no real relation in
the first year of a changed system to mere numbers of case dispositions.
Positively, in the tort jury field, a massive reduction of cases pending
produced only a very limited reduction of time span. Negatively, in the
criminal field, a virtual standoff between filings and true dispositions was
accompanied by a very noticeable decrease in time spans of active cases.
The reasons for this phenomenon, as to tort jury cases, are explained here.
PROSPECTS OF IMPROVEMENT UNDER THE RULES' SYSTEM
The choice of assigning all cases, civil and criminal, to the same group
of judges and then of specifying almost absolute priority in time treatment
between them, poses some problems for the most disfavored group of
cases, the tort jury or personal injury group. It has already been noted
that in other jurisdictions where there are separate criminal courts and
judges and the more adjustable criminal divisions of multi-judge courts,
such as was formerly the Ohio practice, the time lapses from filing to
disposition are far more speedy in the tort judge case field. Because of the
newness of the unrestricted individual judges' docket system in Ohio, it
is difficult to show this difference in time of processing by empirical
studies conducted on a before and after basis.
In theory, at least, the criminal case processing should register
improvement in time of disposition and the tort jury case should lose, or
at least register far less shortening of its time lapses for an initial period.
In one of the two counties studied in detail on a before and after
basis, Summit, this has not occurred at all. The time from indictment to
102 The "norm" time seems to be going the other way. Formerly the time limit for
"other civil" cases was set by the Superintendent Rules and Form A at 12 months, but
in his State of the Judiciary Message, the Chief Justice placed the new time at
18 months. 46 Ohio Bar at 756.
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trial has not changed appreciably in five years, before and after the
adoption of the Rules of Superintendence, while the time span from filing
to disposition in tort cases has lengthened only slightly over the same
period of time. The rather shocking comparison of backlog statistics
during 1971 and 1972, embracing the last year of the divisioned courts
and the first year of the unlimited individual judges' docket, is, even if
the 1972 figures were properly amended, quite disturbing. If, on a
statewide basis, the common pleas courts reduced the criminal backlog
by some 2,500 cases in the last year of a divisioned court system and then
suddenly suffered that backlog under the new system to increase or at
best remain constant in 1972, there is some reason to doubt the efficacy
of the system inaugurated by the Rules of Superintendence in expediting
criminal cases. And if, at the same time, the general civil docket backlog
was reduced by only 1,200 cases statewide in 1971 and the personal injury
case backlog alone was reduced by 3,837 cases statewide under the Rules
in 1972, it shakes faith in whether the priorities are, in fact, being observed.
The obvious should be pointed out, however. Old civil and
particularly old tort cases can be terminated by notice and pen stroke.
Criminal terminations depend on the willingness of defendant and
prosecutor to bargain pleas, or on the cooperation of the prosecutor in
entering a nolle prosequi. In addition, the effects of massive, if belated,
terminations are likely to have different effects on the observed time spans
in the criminal and the tort jury field, since a much higher percentage of
the criminal class is disposed of in the calendar year of filing than
of the latter. Nonetheless, the greater reduction of civil backlog so far
indicated by the 1972 Summary under the Rules does indicate that
the priorities assigned are not so far working to the advantage of the
criminal case dispositions. And tort jury dispositions are not hurt as
much as might be expected by the unlimited personal docket system.
Such an observation, incorrectly premised, may well be one of the side
effects of purposeful neglect in correcting computer programming errors
which affect official court statistics.
But even considering the above amelioration of relative loss, the
personal docket system mandated by the Rules has inherent difficulties
of application which will continue to inhibit more rapid termination of
either class of cases in the metropolitan counties where the masses of case
filings occur. Under the divisioned system in Cleveland, for instance, 10
judges at most would be trying defended state felony cases and probably
not more than 12 others would be at work on tort jury matters at the
same time. Under the unlimited personal docket system practiced by
compulsion in the local common pleas court and by preference in the
U.S. District Court there, it is conceivable that a total of 35 judges could
all select either a criminal or a tort jury case for trial on the same day.
The strain on the limited number of lawyers in the "21st Street" criminal
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bar would be unbearable. Yet the pressure on the equally limited
insurance defense bar and the select products liability claimants bar might
be scarcely less so. Of course, questions of probabilities or chance would
be likely to prevent such an atrocity from occurring. But chance is a less
effective protector against excesses of the engaged counsel rule than is
the advance structuring of the courts to meet available demands and needs.
But regardless of nightmarish results, it has been observed that
calendar breakdowns occur less frequently in divisionalized courts such as
Jacksonville, Florida, and Baton Rouge, Louisiana, as well as in the
separate court systems in Tennessee, than they do under individual judges'
docket systems where the court is undivisioned. It must be admitted that
this is an age of specialization and that the same trial counsel in
metropolitan communities rarely engage in criminal, civil jury and equity
trials. It is unrealistic to insist that they do so, simply because the decision
has been made to make every judge a generalist to operate under the
theory that he be set to work trying one of these three types of cases at
the very same time. Under the unlimited individual docket system, massive
calendar breakdowns cannot be avoided, even by adopting a trailing
docket for each judge or by overloading beyond reason his daily
trial docket. Either alternative is highly distasteful to the practicing bar.
It has been previously noted that tort jury dispositions by early
settlement are inhibited by the unfortunate use of the term "norm" in
describing the apparent maximum time a case is supposed to be allowed
to remain pending after its filing. But the greatest impediment to faster
progress in these tort jury cases is some uninspired tinkering with the
time-tested Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when they were used as a
model for the writing of the Ohio Civil Rules. A case in point is Ohio
Rule 16,103 relative to pretrial procedure, and copied with much stultifying
additional verbiage from the federal rule of the same number. The success
of the federal district court judges in an unstructured pretrial conference,
which they have the unfettered discretion to convene, is proverbial. They
cajole; they threaten; they insist upon stipulations of minor and undisputed
fact; they require advance disclosure of witnesses and testimony and, most
important, they insist upon the completion of discovery before the
conference is held. Admittedly, they have, by virtue of good behavior
103 Other examples of tinkering: Rules 3(B) and 4.6(A), which confuse the subjectg
of in personam jurisdiction and venue, as applied particularly to the limited jurisdic-
tion courts, thus eliminating statutory limitations of the exercise of in personam
jurisdiction. The federal rules wisely left the subject of in personam jurisdiction and
venue to statute.
Rule 49(C) abolishing special verdicts which the federal judges have wide
discretion to frame.
Rule 50(B) which eliminates the motion for directed verdict as a prerequisite
for motion for judgment n.o.v., thus perpetuating one of Ohio's cute little trial from
ambush tricks.
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tenure, a somewhat greater clout with the practicing bar than do their
short-term elected state counterparts who are frequently unnecessarily
deferential to the demands of eminent or politically powerful counsel.
But in setting pretrial standards, the Ohio pretrial rule introduces the
principle of collegiality into whether to have pretrial at all, and then
insists that the whole format of the conference be controlled by a
collegially adopted judicial rule governing its detail, 10 4 which introduces
the lowest common denominator of inefficiency and acceptability to the
practicing bar at large.
In addition, the Ohio rule poses nine specific objectives of the
conference, four of which are so routine and pedestrian that they stamp
all other objectives, eiusdem generis, as equally pedestrian and routine.
One objective: "(8) The imposition of sanctions as authorized by Rule
37'"105 indicates that there can be no insistence on the completion of
pretrial discovery before the time of the conference because it is to be
taken up with the question of who shall answer what question in an
interrogatory or deposition under pain of exclusion of further discovery. A
final addition of the objectives of the rule, made first in the priority of
mention, if not of importance, is settlement of the case, presumably at the
conference itself. This was inserted despite the rarely joined opinions of
Mr. Justice Brennan who helped to institute the New Jersey pretrial rule
and Professor Maurice Rosenberg, who conducted highly detailed tests of
its accomplishments and deficiencies1 6 They agreed that settlement, per
se, was an undesirable subject of the conference action, and a seldom
achieved result. It is apparently Ohio's habit not to profit from the
experience of other states, however well documented. Judging from
the failure of settlement oriented pretrial in Cleveland, as illustrated
in the Cleveland Quarries case, 07 Ohio does not even seem to have the
desire to profit from its own experiences. The standardization of
the pretrial conference and the omission of insistence on really
worthwhile and attainable objectives used in connection with it, some
of which are set forth herein, stamp pretrial in Ohio as just one more
stage in the litigation process to be gone through-just another way
station on the path to long-delayed trial or to settlement at leisure.
104 Rule 16, O.R.Csv.P. reads, "a court may adopt rules concerning pretrial procedure
to accomplish the following objectives." (emphasis added.)
105 Id.
106 Mr. Justice Brennan's remarks to the American Bar Association's Section on
Judicial Administration, August 23, 1955, are reprinted in 17 F.R.D. 479, 485 (1955);
the Rosenberg claim's 4 and 5 are contained in THE PRETRI4L COFERENCE AND
EFFECTIVE JUSTICE 18-20 (1964).
107 Bognar v. Cleveland Quarries Co., 7 Ohio App.2d 187, 219 N.E.2d 331 (1966).
From its nature, the plaintiffs claim for a mandatory injunction requiring production
of records in aid of a prospective dissenting stockholder's action, does not seem
susceptible of any form of pretrial, and particularly of the mass pretrial technique in
which litigants' counsel bargain solely on money settlements.
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A PROGRAM TO EXPEDITE TORT JURY CASES TO DISPOSITION
It should be apparent from the limited and purely "housekeeping"
gains achieved under the first year of the Rules of Superintendence that
there is no real hope of achieving docket currency in the tort jury field by
Labor Day, 1973, or by any other Labor Day in the reasonably forseeable
future. This observation is made without regard to the rather easy
definition of currency--"a norm" of trial within 24 months as pronounced
by the Chief Justice. 08 The reason is the same as that for failures
elsewhere: excessive reliance on structural and administrative changes in
the courts as cure-alls, and insufficient attention to methods of operation.
Ohio, in adopting its policies, rightly recoiled from the New Jersey method
of rigid controls on the activities of its trial judges, including a virtual
diarying of how he spends his working day and dictating when he should
open and close court each day.109 But insistence upon petty regulations for
judicial conduct is no worse than setting a broadaxe standard of ultimate
performance-the same for every metropolis and every hamlet-without
suggestion as to the methods by which the result is to be achieved.
There are four distinct methods of expediting the tort jury process,
tried singularly in diverse jurisdictions with almost uniform success, which
could be erected into a single system, since they revolve around a single
fulcrum: the pretrial conference. There is nothing that is new or
revolutionary about them; they are known and have been described
108 There would appear to be two errors in planning that all cases be completed
within a specified time. The first is that all cases, even all tort jury or personal injury
cases, are NOT equal or that some are more equal than others. Emphasis on the
maximum time a difficult or unsettable or an unmatured jury case is to pend tends
to make the judges less conscious of the possibility of disposing of routine cases in
considerably less time. Since some cases are filed without intention of pursuing them
to the ultimate conclusion, it would appear only good housekeeping to force their
disposition within the maximum allowable time, but without diverting attention from
those more quickly disposable. A sliding scale, insisting on a disposition of 50 per
cent of cases within six months, 75 per cent within 10 months, 90 per cent within
15 months and the balance within two years, would seem more reasonable and engage
the judges' attention on the truly disposable cases at an earlier time.
The second, and related, error is in selecting the period of 24 months as a
goal, at a time when many counties inside and outside the state have already exceeded
that goal. If Portage and Summit counties, Ohio, in 1966 and 1968 respectively could
achieve this, if Sullivan, Hamilton and Knox counties, Tennessee, Calcasieu Parish,
Louisiana, and Duval and other counties in Florida, can consistently do far better,
what is the magic of the goal set for Ohio? See note 14, supra.
109 For description of what many have referred to as the "stop watch" system of
weekly judicial reporting of activity see VANDERBILT, The Application of Sound
Business Principles to Judicial Administration, SELECTED WRITINGS OF ARTHUR T.
VANDERBILT 90, as reprinted from Improving the Administration of Justice, Two
Decades of Development, 26 CIN. L. REV. 155 (1957). Recently the administrator
and Chief Justice were seriously considering changing the hour at which each New
Jersey judge was required to go into the courtroom to open court, regardless of the
nature of the business at hand.
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in professional journals.' It is merely that they have never yet been
described as combined into a single operation or institutionalized so
that combined they can be judged as a unified plan.
The first of these devices is suggested but incompletely implemented
by Superintendence Rule 7, that of early file review. The theory of the
Rule is that the review shall come not later than 90 days after the case is
filed, but the theory is weakened by the stipulation that the judge may, as
an alternative, "cause it to be reviewed" by someone else,"' presumably
by a clerk with no power of decision. Actually, the time selected is not
too soon for a judicially conducted status conference which the federal
judges use with success. At this conference, the judge could ascertain
whether the case is actually, or only apparently, defaulted, insist on setting
a hearing for damages or the prompt filing of a defensive pleading, inquire
as to the progress and problems of discovery and, most important, set in
the presence of counsel the date for the pretrial conference. The
importance of an early pretrial conference date, taken in conjunction with
the following suggestion, is that it will advance the discovery process.
The second step is one already used to advantage elsewhere: the
cutoff of discovery opportunity by a date fixed with reference to the filing
of the case. Many, if not most, lawyers are born or trained proscrastinators
who postpone the chore of trial preparation until as close to the actual
trial date as possible. The delay provides alternatives as to choice of
witnesses to be produced if available, time for second thoughts on the
theory of the case, possibility of settlement before any real work is done
on the case and the like. Unfortunately, the delay in preparation of the
case for trial is likely to represent a delay in any possibility of settlement,
because most cases are settled only between adversaries well informed of
their own as well as their adversaries' strengths and weaknesses. Since at
least 60 per cent of tort jury cases are settled before trial, early preparation
is the sine qua non of early settlement. The most logical time at which to
insist on the completion of discovery is that of the pretrial conference.
Accordingly, the conference must be set down comparatively early in the
litigation process and without regard as to when the case may be reached
for trial, if tried-90 to 120 days after the filing of the case. This could
not occur too early in the complex class actions or ecological cases in
state courts any more than it would in complex antitrust cases in federal
11o See Judge Roger Waybright's discussion of the Duval County, Florida, system in
52 Judicature 334, as contrasted with those in Allegheny County, Pa., by Judge
Aldisert, 51 Judicature 203, 247, 298. The enforcement of discovery cutoff was also
recommended in ORDER IN THE COURTS. See also note 14, supra. The scheduling
techniques as used in Tennessee and parts of Louisiana were recommnded in 14
WM. & MARY L. REV. at 43.
111 Superintendence Rule 7 provides: "Each judge of a court of common pleas shall
review or cause to be reviewed quarterly all cases assigned to him...." (emphasis
added.)
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courts. But for the average personal injury action it not only could
but should be done. One additional factor is needed to insure early
preparation. The expected testimony of favorable witnesses as to which no
discovery is required should be reduced to writing and signed. Finally,
testimony of those as to whom there is any doubt as to ability to appear
at trial in the remote future, should be recorded by depositions.
While the cutoff of discovery and insistence on perpetuation of
favorable testimony by the time of the pretrial conference is a feature
of many courts, most of them are somewhat accommodating to the bar
about setting the date of the conference. Some will not set it until one
counsel or the other has formally asked that the case be placed on the
trial calendar. Others insist on a certificate of readiness for trial which
carries with it the assurance that counsel offering the certificate had
already completed his discovery on his own time, at his own pace, and in
accordance with his own convenience. The most successful courts,
however, are those which give the attorneys no time options on
exercising discovery, but set down the run of the mill cases for pretrial
conference within a limited time after the filing of the case and require
counsel on both sides to be bound by that preset date in exercising
their rights to discovery.
The third ingredient, the only one which makes necessary the
conducting of a pretrial conference in every case, is the requirement of
disclosure. The common requirement of all courts, at least by way of lip
service, is that counsel must be as prepared for the pretrial conference
as for the trial itself. This requirement, in many state courts including
Ohio's, is honored more in the breach than in the observance. Counsel
come to pretrial to find out how much evidence they need to produce,
rather than to assess the value of what they have. The requirement that
all discovery be completed by the time of the conference is valuable, but
it is not enough. That of requiring that all the testimony in chief be
reduced to an informal trial brief backed by written statements or
depositions of expected favorable witnesses is helpful, but still leaves
a gap. Counsel at the pretrial conference must be prepared to lay it on
the line as to the identity of the witnesses whom they will call to testify
and at least the general nature of the testimony to be expected. This must
be disclosed both to adversary and to the judge; the adversary so that he
can better assess the strength of the case; the judge so that he can better
assess in his own mind, the possibility of settlement and length of trial.
Many trial counsel will object strongly that this deprives them of the
advantage of gamesmanship in flashing the surprise witness. So it does!
Trial from ambush should have disappeared from the scene 20 years ago
and there is no need for perpetuating it further-' 2 Other counsel will
112 See note 92, supra.
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object, with more apparent reason, that they are giving opportunity for
free discovery to their indolent adversaries. This is only partially true,
because the discovery cutoff rule will prevent these adversaries from
taking advantage of the disclosure by proceeding further with their efforts
to locate potentially adverse witnesses. The adversary will be stuck with
the effect of the disclosed witness's story on direct examination, subject
only to cross examination at trial, and he will have no opportunity to
discover additional witnesses to discredit this witness's tale.
Two additional powers will be needed by the pretrial judges under
such requirements. They must have the power to require that each counsel
proceed at trial with only the witnesses disclosed at pretrial, and they
must also be empowered to prevent the padding of the witness list by
reminding each of counsel that he will draw unfavorable comment from
the trial judge at trial time if he fails to call the listed witnesses. Exercising
both of these powers will require the careful preparation of a document
now treated as a pro forma routinized document," 3 the pretrial order,
which must be accepted in the sense in which the federal judges use it, as
controlling the entire course of the ensuing trial, if trial is held. This is, of
course, much paperwork to be expected of a judge in a case which will
probably be settled without trial in any event. The justification for it is that
it will make possible an earlier settlement than could otherwise be expected.
The final step, also to be performed at the pretrial conference, is the
setting of the trial date for a fixed time in the future, while both counsel
are present. Again, it will be objected that this is wasted time if the case
will be settled early in all probability. The answer is that it will be settled
only when counsel on both sides know that the moment of truth is
ascertained if not yet reached. The advocates of modernization will
immediately offer a computerized trial setting as superior, but it is, in
fact, not." 4 A computerized scheduling cannot take advantage of the
3The pretrial order in many Ohio counties is frequently a preprinted, "fill in the
blanks," as to names of parties, medical records, X-rays, and picture exhibits-type
of thing used primarily as a checklist on the obvious.
114. See E. ADAMS, COURTS AND COMPUTERS, AMERICAN JUDIcATUxE SocIETY, 71-72,
76-79, 108 (1972). Experience of Duval County, Florida, is an example. The
computer is used for the typical variety of repetitive tasks, including sorting,
classifying, list preparation and summonses, and including delivery to each judge at
two-week intervals of his older undisposed-of cases. Appearance (progress) docket
sheets are printed out and continuously updated with each new document filed,
undoubtedly at high expense, but with instant inspectability because a computer
terminal and printer is physically located in the clerk's office. Thus, there is no
problem of scheduling input at dead times of the computer, since the court has
priority of use. Despite such availability and extensive use of the computer, thejudges, prior to January 1, 1973, shied away from doing their case scheduling by
computer, and each judge scheduled his cases by hand, resolving apparent conflicts
with counsel at the time of trial setting.
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psychological factors present in the judge's chambers. It gives the oppor-
tunity of inventing excuses and of discovering conflicting events by counsel
whose only purpose is to delay trial, and it cannot set down multiple trials
for the same day in realistic appraisal of their settlement possibilities. Such
a system requires that the trials be set down two or three or four on the
same day, in accordance with the judge's reasoned estimate, or counsels'
assurances, of their settlement possibilities. The order in which those cases
will be tried on the day in question, with the first case required to be tried
at all hazards if not earlier settled, and the second and third required to be
tried on an hour's notice if the first case goes off the schedule for any
reason including late settlement, must be known in advance by all con-
cerned. In the event the first case does in fact go to trial, the second and
third cases must have their alternate or secondary trial date fixed for a
month or two later, at which time they become the priority cases. Under
such an arrangement, there is a maximum option for readjusting the later
schedules if the second and third cases are themselves actually tried or
settled on the original date. Such a system sounds, and is, complex, but it
has been used with considerable success in parts of Louisiana and, even
without benefit of the partial conference, in much of the State of Tennessee.
It should be noted that nothing has been said here about settlements
at the pretrial conference itself. It has not been emphasized, although
there is nothing wrong with the judge making settlement negotiations a
part of the pretrial conference. As long as he does not insist on a settlement
then and there, as so many short-sighted judges do, there is probably
nothing inherently evil about the practice; it is simply over-emphasized by
judges with fixed-track minds. As Mr. Justice Brennan has indicated,
settlement generally comes in the interval between the conference and the
trial date.- 5 Little is gained by harassing counsel, who must have time to
sell their clients on the desirability of any figure arrived at, and settlement
reached by such means, as Mr. Justice Brennan suggests, is likely to be
more acceptable to them. Trial must, therefore, be postponed until at least
three weeks, and probably at least three months, after the conference, to
permit interested counsel to work out the details of the settlement, armed
with the disclosures of the conference itself. The time is also frequently
needed for the convening of the slow thinking and slow acting committees
of liability carriers who sometimes have this type of ponderous machinery
embedded in their claims settlement processes.
It is not suggested that such a plan be broadaxed in forcing all of
Ohio's counties to adopt it at once, regardless of size or condition.
The small, one-judge county may not need such elaborate machinery. The
metropolitan counties would probably require some modifications of it,
including, in some, the recreation of the criminal divisions, and in
115 Remarks at A.B.A. Section on Judicial Administration, 17 F.R.D. 479, 485 (1955).
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others, divisions of available general duty judges into team units, so that
all judges would not be in the position of competing with each other for
the attentions of a limited specialist bar. It is in the medium sized counties
of two, three or four judges that a single judge doing all pretrial and trial
scheduling work for the court may be the best answer. Some such counties
may find it advantageous to use experienced litigation counsel as
paraprofessional masters and calendar control commissioners to conduct
pretrial and trial scheduling. In others it will take a trained judge with all
the powers of the full judicial office to force an unwilling bar into line.
Such a judge can, in some cases, be secured by the retirement and replace-
ment of overage judges who can then be called back to active duty to try
cases while their successors are freed to perform the pretrial and trial
scheduling functions. In still others, an assigned judge can be used, on a
part-time basis, for the whole of the pretrial-trial scheduling process.
The most important requirement for the success of the plan therefore
is that it NOT be immediately adopted throughout the state. It is a
theoretical plan which may or may not work out as well as its proposer
hopes. It should, therefore, be tried out in a single limited area where the
need is great, where the climate is favorable, where existing judges are
willing to experiment and have the results of the experiment measured and
methods open to review by critique. Most of all, it should be in some area
where the trained manpower or judge-power can be quickly made available.
The plan may have to be modified in accordance with observed results.
It is suggested that the six-county Order in the Courts territory
would be the logical place in which to conduct the experiment on a trial
basis. It contains two medium-sized counties, three sub-metropolitan
centers and one metropolis which has defied every effort to reform its
procedures to obtain worthwhile results. It has its areas in which there
are overage judges, some retired and recalled; some merely retired; and
some still determinedly sitting. It has its metropolitan counties which
are familiar with the use of assigned judges. Finally, it has more than
its share of king-sized problems which cry out for solution by any
new plan which is available to be tried out.
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